Bayesian Statistics
Donald A. Berry, PhD T he present issue of Medical Decision Making focuses on probability sensitivity analysis and Bayesian statistics. [1] [2] [3] This editorial addresses probability sensitivity analysis and the changing role of the Bayesian approach in medical research generally.
First a bit of history. The foundation of statistics has seen thrusts and parries between Bayesians and frequentists. Bayesians pride themselves on the abilityand indeed, the necessity-to synthesize the results from all available sources of information. Frequentists pride themselves on a rigorous handling of the evidence from individual experiments. Synthesis always requires assumptions and modeling, and frequentists see the dangers of such enterprises.
Medical research over the past 200 years has seen similar thrusts and parries-between those who want to assess quantitative evidence and those who regard individual patients as unique and having their own peculiar responses to therapy. 4 Quantifiers assess treatment differences by considering populations of patients that differ only by treatment. Quantification requires assumptions that my-patient-is-unique clinicians find objectionable. So although the medical schism is on a different level than that between Bayesian and frequentist statisticians, there is a close analogy.
In medical research, the quantifiers have won, or at least they seem to be winning by a wide margin. Curiously, this win is due in large part to the influence of frequentist biostatistics (and of course to the advent of the randomized clinical trial). Trials designed from a frequentist perspective have shown that some conventional therapies are useless and trials addressing innovative therapies sometimes show great benefit. The high regard for biostatistics and biostatisticians in medical science is directly attributable to the rigor of the frequentist approach.
However, "personalized medicine" is making a comeback. Appropriately so. Within populations that benefit, on average, from a particular therapy, a great many patients receive no benefit at all. Modern medical science is poorly equipped for identifying characteristics of patients who benefit from particular therapies, in large part because of the rigor of frequentist methods. In particular, the frequentist approach is not very good at discriminating subsets of patients who benefit, but many Bayesian methods are "too good" in the sense that they are prone to overfitting. Perhaps a spirit of ecumenism in which Bayesians and frequentists learn from each other will be necessary to begin to crack this knotty but critically important problem.
The Bayesian/frequentist distinction is similar in decision making. Frequentist decisions have historically been confined to the question of rejecting hypotheses within the context of a particular experiment. Although "experiment" can be a collection of experiments, frequentists tend to balk at combining experiments retrospectively because this approach makes their standard measures such as type I error rates difficult or impossible to assess. Bayesian analysis is naturally synthetic. The culmination of the Bayesian approach is the posterior probability distribution of the various parameters-such as relative treatment effectiveness. For these reasons, "decision analysis" is widely regarded as being associated with a Bayesian approach. Indeed, stopping at providing one's posterior could be viewed as only partially Bayes, with continuing on to assessing utilities of consequences of actions required for a fully Bayesian approach.
The Bayesian approach is ideal for assessing and conveying uncertainty. One's prior distribution represents uncertainty in the parameters at the start of an experiment. The posterior distribution usually has less variance than does the prior, but it still has some variability. A final Bayesian conclusion might be that a therapy has 96% probability of being effective. However one interprets such a statement, it conveys a sense of uncertainty-the therapy might or might not be effective. Any conclusion that is a probability is equivocal. In this sense, a Bayesian conclusion is inherently sensitive.
All Bayesian posterior probabilities depend on the statistical model assumed and on the prior distribution assumed. So another Bayesian in the above example might conclude 88% probability of effectiveness. One way to resolve the difference is to publish the likelihood function and explain to the reader how to convert it into the reader's probability distribution. But the likelihood is not always available for exhibiting, especially with some of the complicated analyses exemplified by the articles in this issue. In addition, stopping at the likelihood function inhibits being fully Bayesian in the sense above.
A different type of resolution is a probability sensitivity analysis in which one considers a variety of prior distributions (and sometimes a variety of statistical models as well) and displays the posterior probabilities for each. One chooses a range of prior distributions that encompass the distributions of most readers. If the posterior probabilities vary little, then the conclusion is not sensitive to the prior.
Such an approach is honest and useful. But it has downsides. One is that it is a compounding of uncertainties. (Presumably, a Bayesian observer would associate a probability with each answer and average with respect to his or her probability distribution over the prior distributions assumed, coming up with a single probability.) Another downside is that although honesty may be the best policy, flaunting one's honesty is not necessarily the best way to influence policy makers. People get confused when they hear more than one answer to the same question. In a particularly troubling example, a California court heard a criminal case involving DNA fingerprinting. Random match probabilities presented to the court varied from 1 in 700 million (by the prosecution's expert) to 1 in 70,000 (by the defense's expert) depending on the assumptions made. The court was confused by the existence of two probabilities for the same event and excluded all testimony regarding probabilities. (The court was no doubt unaware that in so doing it was imposing still a third probability, one that was miles away from both the prosecution and the defense!) I want to end with a comment about Bayesian design of experiments, which is being increasingly utilized in pharmaceutical and medical device trials. Some of the most interesting applications of the Bayesian approach would be impossible without modern computing hardware and software, including many of the articles in this issue. These applications would be difficult to duplicate from a frequentist perspective. However, a greater benefit is achievable from taking a Bayesian perspective in experimental design than in data analysis. Bayesian updating is possible at any time. For example, clinical trials can be designed to change course depending on accumulating data. 5 An interim analysis can be more involved than a final analysis. It might include such computer-intensive calculations as those required in hierarchical modeling and decision analysis. But it also includes finding predictive distributions based on the current data, and making decisions based on these distributions-including, perhaps, using dynamic programming. Moreover, there can be arbitrarily many interim analyses. Computing advances have freed the Bayesian to build designs that heretofore were not possible. One can check the frequentist operating characteristics of any such design (using simulation and given enough computer time), but it would be impossible to build such a design outside of the Bayesian approach.
